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R U M I NATION S ON TE R ROR I S M:
EXPIATION AN D EXPOS ITION
Christopher L. Blakesley*
To paraphrase Richard Falk: Terrorism is political or ideological violence
without restraint of law or morality. This article will consider terrorism and
reactions to terrorism through a prism of history, philosophy, literature, and
law. It is an attempt to show how terrorism is committed by state actors, as
well as non-state-actors. I argue that intentional or reckless slaughter of inno-
cents or torturing “enemies” constitutes terrorism and that it ultimately erodes
a state’s or a group’s morality and well-being. Most nations and groups define
terrorism in a way that “allows” them to commit atrocity, but condemns “oth-
ers” who commit the same acts. This ultimately promotes terrorism. Some
definitions obscure the line between terrorism as a crime and terrorism as a
tactic or strategy of armed conflict. It is important that the law not do this,
as I argue that terrorism is criminal conduct. In addition, many, perhaps
most, definitions of terrorism, even in criminal statutes and treaties, do not
comport with basic principles of criminal law, such as principles of legality,
due process, and other human rights and constitutional norms. I will also
compare terrorism to other core international concepts, such as war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Thus, the article will consider terrorism as a
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crime, noting the conceptual relationship between terrorism and basic domes-
tic and international substantive criminal law. I will present a definition of
terrorism as a crime, including its constituent elements. This allows me to
study terrorism in the context of basic principles of culpability and innocence.
The definition applies to conduct whether performed by state or government
actors, by those who attack innocents to get at state government, or who use
it against innocent members of factions whom they don’t see as adhering to
the actor’s vision of “good order.” Much of the article, however, is aimed at
providing context by analyzing historical evidences of terrorism, including
torture and other atrocities, designed to promote the power of those commit-
ting it. Thus, I will present an historical and comparative excursus, consid-
ering terrorism or analogous conduct and its punishment from antiquity,
through the Middle Ages, to the present day, to show why such conduct ought
to be punished.
I .  I NTROD UCTION
Violence shall synchronize your movements like a tune,
And Terror like a frost shall halt the flood of thinking.
Barrack and bivouac shall be your friendly refuge,
And racial pride shall tower like a public column
And confiscate for safety every private sorrow.’
Leave Truth to the police and us; we know the Good;
We build the Perfect City time shall never alter;
Our Law shall guard you always like a circue of mountains. . . .1
A. Overview
This article shows how the term terrorism and the law that proscribes its
forms are appropriated to exclude one’s own acts of terrorism. Terrorism
and its analogues, war crimes and crimes against humanity, have been
committed since antiquity.2 Systems and theories attempting to check
1. W.H. Auden, The Collected Poetry of W.H. Auden 342 (1945).
2. Exodus 21:24; Yoram Dinstein, International Law As a Primitive Legal System, 19
N.Y.U.J. Int’l. L. & Pol. 1, 11 (1986). See Code of Hammurabi (1728–1686 B.C.); Laws of
Eshnunna (2000 B.C.); Code of Ur-Nammu (2100 B.C.).
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such atrocities have also occurred since antiquity.3 More recently, develop-
ments since Nuremberg have eviscerated the historical excuses and justifi-
cations for war crimes and crimes against humanity.4 Hope survives, but
reality remains gloomy. For example, Curtis LeMay, the Air Force General
who oversaw the slaughter of an estimated 900,000 people in firebomb-
ings of Japanese cities,5 admitted that if the United States lost the war, he
would have been tried as a war criminal, but claimed that the firebomb-
ings were “the right thing to do.”6 As states are expected to enforce war
crime laws against their own, one would like to hope that war crimes and
like offenses would cease to be something only noticed when enemies
3. Rules prohibiting what we now call “crimes against humanity” or crimes against
some “higher law” have existed from antiquity. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 20:13–17 (King
James); Sun Tzu, The Art of War 76 (Samuel B. Griffith, trans., 1963); Code of Manu bk.7,
art. 92 (“Let him not strike . . . one who is naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who
looks on without taking part in the fight.”); 1 The Law of War: A Documentary History
3, 59–62 (Leon Friedman, ed., 1972) [hereinafter Documentary History] (discussing jus in
bello, noting that “[a]ncient Greeks and Romans also followed customary laws of war”).
See also Christopher L. Blakesley, Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism: A Normative and
Practical Assessment, chs. 7–11 (2006).
4. Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg
Charter), 59 Stat. 1544, 1546 (1945), eliminated act of state and superior orders as
defenses respectively. The International Military Tribunal concluded that “individuals
have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience
imposed by the individual State . . . He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State, if the State in author-
izing action moves outside its competence under international law.” International
Military Tribunal, Judgment, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946). Also, “[t]he fact that the defendant
acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility. . . .” Id.
5. Steven Veenema, Note, Willful Ignorance—Contextualizing U.S. Policy Toward the
International Criminal Court, 30 Suffolk L. Rev. 167 (2006), referencing Donald R. Davis
& David E. Weinstein, Bones, Bombs and Break Points: The Geography of Economic
Activity, (Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series No.
0102-02, January, 2002), at 19, available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/disc-
papr/DP0102.pdf (indicating a number of cities that were firebombed); Gary Jonathan
Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals 8–9 (2000) (cit-
ing sixty-three instead of sixty-six targeted cities); Robert S. McNamara, We Need Rules
for War, L.A. Times, August 3, 2003, at M5 (noting the number of Japanese people killed
in firebombing raids).
6. McNamara, supra note 5. But see Bass, supra note 5 (quoting LeMay as referring to
the war in the past tense); Veenema, supra note 5, at 167.
NCLR1004_04.qxd  3/1/08  11:10 AM  Page 556
commit them.7 Crimes against humanity appear to have some acceptance
and enforceability, although their enforcement tradition remains even
weaker than for war crimes.8 The crime of terrorism has not been as suc-
cessful. The word “terrorism” has yet to develop a description of universally
condemned behavior, and remains a mere epithet to apply to enemies.9
B. War Crimes 
A war crime is conduct that violates international humanitarian law appli-
cable during armed conflict.10 Although the Nuremberg and Tokyo char-
ters limited the scope of war crimes to international armed conflict,11
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7. See infra sections I.B.; IV.A.-C. Although countries occasionally prosecute their own
for war crimes and like crimes, the record is not great. See, e.g., Telford Taylor, Nuremberg
and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (1970); Blakesley, supra note 3, chs. 8, 10, 11; Jeremy
Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence For the White House, 105 Colum. L.
Rev. 1681, 1740–41, & nn.253–54 (2005) (comparing domestic abuse in U.S. prisons to Abu
Ghraib); Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, ch. 4 (2007)
(challenging basic assumptions of international criminal justice and expressing the need to
transcend them for a broad range of responses); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute
Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons from Abroad, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 569
(2007). Still, some prosecution occurs, at least against those at lower ranks. See, e.g., U.S.
v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (CMA 1973); Multiple Proceedings Against U.S. Service Members
for Deaths of Iraqi Civilians, in Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l. L. 950 (John R. Crook ed., 2006); Navy Investigating
Intentional Killings of Civilians in Haditha, Iraq, in Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l. L. 713 (John R. Crook ed., 2006);
Michael Duffy, The Shame of KILO Company, Time Mag., May 28, 2006, available at
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1198892,00.html.
8. See sources cited supra note 5.
9. See infra sections I.D and IV, particularly section IV.A, “Propagandistic
Appropriation of the Term ‘Terrorism’”; Blakesley, supra note 3, chs. 5, 7, 8, 9.
10. Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law 129 (2001) (providing some
history and sources); Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 18–19
(1993).
11. Nuremberg Charter, article 6, provided authority to try and punish persons for
crimes including: “(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war
[including but not limited to], murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment
of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity.”
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Geneva Protocol II12 and customary international law extend these rules to
armed conflict not of an international character.13 The Rome Statute for
the International Criminal Court provides an expansive listing of war
crimes, in article 8(2),14 which, for purposes of the statute’s jurisdictional
threshold, must be part of a plan or policy or part of a large scale com-
mission of such crimes.15 The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Tadic categorized war crimes as serious violations that (i) infringe a rule of
humanitarian law that is (ii) customary in nature, or meets the conditions
of treaty law, (iii) and that protects important values; where the breach
involves grave consequences for the victim, (iv) customary or conventional
law must establish the individual perpetrator’s criminal responsibility.16
C. Crimes Against Humanity
A crime against humanity is conduct that violates “humaneness,” offending
important principles of law to the degree that it concerns the international
community; has “repercussions beyond international frontiers”; or “exceeds
in magnitude or savagery any limits tolerated by modern civilization.”17 The
term “crime against humanity” has been used in a nontechnical sense, at
least since the declaration of May 28, 1915, wherein the governments of
France, Great Britain, and Russia denounced the massacres (genocide) of
the Armenian population by the Turkish government.18 International
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12. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
13. Customary international law on this issue has evolved through international instru-
ments and conventions, such as the ICTR, art. 4; the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 2(c)-(f ), plus customary rules of
international law and general principles that these instruments either reflect or have
established.
14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
art. 8(2).
15. Id. art. 8(1).
16. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 94 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
17. Kittichaisaree, supra note 10, at 85, citing Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity,
23 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 178, 195–97 (1946).
18. “The Armenian Memorandum presented by the Greek delegation to the Commission
of Fifteen on 14 Mar. 1919.” Schwelb, supra note 17, at 181; see also Kittichaisaree, supra note
10, at 85. 
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agreements have formalized and refined this principle since that time.
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter defined a crime against humanity as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian populations, before or during the war; or
persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether
or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.19
The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court article 7 adds
additional conduct including torture, sexual violence, imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law, group persecution, enforced disappearances of
persons, apartheid, and “other inhumane acts of a similar character inten-
tionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health.”20 This conduct could also be terrorism.
D. Terrorism
Osama Bin Laden appears to have been the highest profile leader to boast
about and exploit “terrorism” to describe actions carried out by his own
side.21 Ironically, others define the word terrorism to exclude their own
conduct and favorite justifications and excuses.22 Modern definitions of ter-
rorism seek to put one’s own state terrorism23 or terrorism by our own or
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19. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), Aug.
8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
art. 7.
21. See Liz Sly, New bin Laden Tape Surfaces, Chicago Trib., Dec. 27, 2001, at 1. In a
message apparently taped three months after the 9/11 attacks, Bin Laden stated that “[o]ur
terrorism against America is a good terrorism.” Id. But see Michael Fellman, Book Review,
72 J. S. Hist. 942 (2006) (reviewing Fergus M. Bordewich, Bound for Canaan: The
Underground Railroad and the War for the Soul of America (2005), and David S.
Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War,
and Seeded Civil Rights (2005).
22. See infra section IV, “The Reign of ‘Counterterror.’”
23. For example, a “Special Report of Covert Operations” commissioned by President
Eisenhower was adopted as hallowed American policy: “Another important requirement is an
aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective . . . and,
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favored “freedom fighters”24 under erasure, prolonging the problem of ter-
rorism with our hypocrisy. To confront terrorism, which is essentially vio-
lence against innocents perpetrated for ideological purposes, we need to
define it honestly, unmasking the pious fraud that riddles our justifications
and excuses for it.
Terrorism in general terms is political or ideological violence without
restraint of law or morality.25 To prosecute and punish terrorist conduct,
we must define terrorism clearly enough that it is not vague so as to vio-
late the principles of legality, due process, and similar constitutional and
human rights principles.26 The following working definition of terrorism
provides an opening point: the use of violence against innocent individuals
for the purpose of obtaining thereby some military, political, or philosophical
end from a third-party government or group.27 An innocent is anyone who is
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if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. . . . There are no rules in such
a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply.” Report of the Special
Study Group on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (the “Doolittle
Report”) (Sept. 30, 1954) (declassified Apr. 1, 1976). See Blakesley, supra note 3, chs. 11, 12
(discussing torture since September 11, 2001); Luis Enrique Cuervo, The Alien Tort Statute,
Corporate Accountability, and the New Lex Petrolea, 19 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 151, 181 (2006);
Tarek F. Maassarani, Four Counts of Corporate Complicity: Alternative Forms of
Accomplice Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 38 N.Y.U. J. Int’l. L. & Pol. 39
(2005–2006). Labeling gangs as “terrorists” has provided “cover” or impunity for police
torture and murder. See, e.g., Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Death Squads Said to Target
Youths: Slayings of Young Men Go Unsolved in Central America, Boston Globe, April 19,
2006, at A-6; Government Blamed for Mounting Mayhem As UN Rapporteur Sees Little
Hope for a Secure Guatemala, NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs, Sept. 21,
2006 (“Perez Molina has said he simply wants to do for Guatemala what Rudolph Guiliani
did for New York. But Albizures hears more of Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, during whose brief
de facto presidency the country was made safe from street crime with a wave of extrajudi-
cial killings. . . .”).
24. For example, China envisions terrorism as a type of “splittism,” to include even
peaceful independence movements on behalf of Taiwan and Tibet. See, e.g., Edieth Y. Wu,
China Today: Why Its Accession to the World Trade Organization Is Inevitable and Good
for the International Community, 5 J. Int’l. Econ. L. 689, 696 (2002).
25. See Richard Falk, Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism
xiv, 19 (1988).
26. For a comparison of these principles in U.S. and Continental law, see Markus Dirk
Dubber, Comparative Criminal Law, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 1287,
1313–22 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007). 
27. The definition of terrorism and the key concepts of “innocents” and motive or purpose
are elucidated in Blakesley, supra note 3.
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not an actual or imminent aggressor.28 My definition rejects application of
self-defense, because innocents include non-combatants in war and non-
attackers in a non-war setting.29 Self-defense does not apply to using deadly
violence against anyone who is not threatening one’s life or limb, in either
context. Unfortunately, many international jurists have not learned or
have forgotten essential and basic criminal law.
Terrorism has always been an instrument of statecraft, domination,
oppression, revolution, and rebellion. A very small sampling includes the
following. The Salvadoran Army in the 1980s reconstituted its program of
mass execution of civilians to intimidate “its enemies.”30 The outrages
against desparacidos 31 and the depredations of the Khmer Rouge are well
known.32 The United States has a long, sad history of supporting
authoritarian governments in Latin America,33 for example, those in
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28. Id.; Regina v. Dudley and Stephens [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273, 285–86 (U.K.). Cf.
Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage On The 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy
Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground,
56 A.F.L. Rev. 1, 4–5, n.12 (2005). The common law and the Model Penal Code require that
one reasonably believe that she is in imminent danger of significant bodily harm. See
People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (imminent danger serious bodily harm from
an aggressor at the time is necessary for a successful claim of self- defense). N.Y. Penal Law
§ 35.05 (McKinney 2005). 
29. Blakelsey, supra note 3, chs. 2, 3.
30. Salvador: dix paysans tués près de la capitale: I’armée reprend ses exécutions collec-
tives, Le Monde, Sept. 22–28, 1988, at 2, cols. 2–5 (Edition Internationale). 
31. See, e.g., sources cited in supra notes 23, 30; Nunca Mas: The Report of the
Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (1986); Amnesty International,
Disappeared Prisoners in Chile 16–17 (1977); Amnesty International, Report of an Amnesty
International Mission to Argentina 6–15 Nov. 1975 (1975); Archdiocese of Sao Paulo,
Torture in Brazil: A Report 204. (Jaime Wright, trans., 1986); Matthew Lippman,
Disappearances: Towards a Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 1 Conn J. Int’l. L. 121, 122, 124 (1988).
32. See, e.g., David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (2007); Craig Etcheson, After
the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide (2005). Other crimes within the
jurisdiction of the tribunal include the internationally defined crimes of destruction of cul-
tural property and crimes against internationally protected persons and the domestic
crimes of homicide, torture, and religious persecution as defined in the Cambodian Penal
Code. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
art. 3–8 (2004), available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/law%20on%20
establishment.htm. 
33. Richard Delgado, Shooting the Messenger, 30 Am. Indian L. Rev. 477, 480–81
(2005–2006) (book review). 
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“Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil and outright dictators, like Somoza in
Nicaragua, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Pinochet in Chile, and
Stroessner in Paraguay, who practiced torture and ‘disappearance’ of
their enemies.”34 The United States government used its intelligence
agents to assist the coup deposing democratically elected Salvador
Allende in Chile, installing Augusto Pinochet whose henchmen tortured
and “assassinated thousands of citizens suspected of disloyalty.”35 The
United States government directly and indirectly supported the
Nicaraguan “Contras,” who allegedly killed innocent Americans and
Nicaraguans in their guerilla war.36 Sandinistas killed innocents, includ-
ing the many of the Miskito indigenous group, to maintain their power.37
Brazilian, Colombian, and Guatemalan death squads have killed poverty
stricken children.38
Terrorism has been defined in ways that endanger democracy, erode
civil liberties, and actually promote terrorism, in that the definition pro-
vides immunity for one’s own terroristic conduct. The United States and
other countries tend to define conduct as terrorism, in ways and at times
it finds convenient.39 The United States, for example, has considered phil-
anthropic organizations providing coloring books to Afghan children to
be engaged in terrorist activities.40
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34. Id., at 480. 
35. Id., at 481.
36. See, e.g., Aryeh Neier, There’s a Contra-diction, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 5, 1987, at 1;
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
37. Neier, supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., Marc D. Seitles, Effect of the Convention on the Rights of the Child upon
Street Children in Latin America: A Study of Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala, 16 In Pub.
Interest 159–60 (1998); Charmaine J. Comprosky, International Law Weekend
Proceedings, The Plight of the Street Children of Latin America Who Are Addicted to
Sniffing Glue, and the Role and Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations, 8 ILSA J.
Int’l. & Comp. L. 599, 602–03, n.39 (2002). 
39. See Ryan J. Sydejko, International Influence on Democracy: How Terrorism
Exploited a Deteriorating Fourth Amendment, 7 J.L. Soc’y 220, 255, 258 (2006).
40. Id. at 258, citing David Cole & James X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the
Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security 153 (2002). See
Blakesley, supra note 3. These are examples of what Nasser Hussain calls “hyperlegality.”
Nasser Hussain, Hyperlegality, 10 New Crim. L. Rev. 514 (2007). This “hyperlegality”
amounts to terrorism.
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Terrorist actions sometimes carry a pseudo-religious purpose that we
shall call expiation, where the innocent suffer to atone for a wrong and to
make the terrorist or his allies whole.41 Another nearly universal purpose
of terrorist actions is what we shall call exposition, where the innocent suffer
in order to help publicize or emphasize a set of messages to one’s enemies
and/or allies.42 In practice, expiation and exposition are closely intertwined.
I will discuss the expiatory and expository effects separately in order to
explore how they correlate.
I I .  H I STOR ICAL EXCU R SUS
A. Expiatory Violence
This section will study examples of attempts to expiate through punish-
ment, considering the relationship between the authority or power to
punish and the people’s need for expiation. Prosecution and punishment
developed to punish crimes committed internally. Leaders have been able
to exploit this by promoting the idea that the good of the group and the
individual were dependant on punishment of enemies and wrongdoers.43
The people needed the wrongdoer to be punished and the wrongdoer
needed punishment.44 If the wrongdoer was a foreigner and had taken
refuge abroad, it was necessary to capture him or a proxy to accomplish
this expiation, often requiring war.45 War, terrorism, and punishment
thus seem to have been cut of the same cloth. Although redemption and
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41. See infra section II.A, “Expiatory Violence.”
42. The word “terrorism” itself emphasizes the effect that the terrorist “message” has on
one’s enemies, but the effect on one’s allies and even on third parties is often much more
significant. The terrorist message often “preaches to the choir”; it is often more important
to persuade one’s reluctant allies that the enemy is afraid than it is to actually terrorize the
enemy. See infra section III, “Expository Violence.”
43. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 1–69 (A.
Sheridan, trans., 1979); Lisa Silverman, Tortured Subjects: Pain, Truth, and the Body in
Early Modern France (2001). 
44. Christopher L. Blakesley, Edwin B. Firmage, Richard F. Scott & Sharon A.
Williams, The International Legal System: Cases & Materials, chs. 3, 16 (5th ed., 2001);
Silverman, supra note 43.
45. See, e.g., Joshua 6:21; 1 Kings 2: 28–34. 
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cleansing the soul are good things, the tendency of group leaders to exploit
this need or instinct is troublesome.
Punishment has been the means to rid society of crime’s perceived
taint.46 In virtually all ancient cultures, metaphysics and law were
merged.47 Society was required to purge itself of the taint of crime, to
avoid the wrath of the God or gods. Punishment of the wrongdoer, com-
bined with religious ceremony, cleansed the community, avoiding divine
wrath. The Code of Manu provided that rest and happiness for the wrong-
doer and society are obtained only by soul-purging punishment of the per-
petrator.48 Metaphysical harm could only be avoided through spilling the
blood of the perpetrator or his proxy. If the perpetrator who put the group
at metaphysical risk escaped, the group had to seek his return or find a
proxy to punish.49
The lex talionis, or law of exact retaliation, in the Jewish Torah or bib-
lical Pentateuch50 “requires” an eye for an eye51 to benefit the punished as
much as the punishers. The social cell or group would require vengeance
against those who were found to have committed a crime against it or its
leader. The punishment for patricide in ancient Rome (specifically includ-
ing killing your mother or father, but also symbolizing regicide) was to be
beaten by rods stained with your blood, put into a bag with a viper, a dog,
a cock, and an ape, and thrown into the sea.52
Blood atonement applied in ancient Israel for some offenses.53 When
murder, theft, or assault were committed, it was necessary that both society
| N E W C R I M I NAL  LAW R E VI E W | VOL .  10 | NO.  4 | FALL 2007564
46. See Fredrik Strom, On the Sacral Origin of the Germanic Death Penalties 14, 208
(1942); Hans von Hentig, Punishment, Its Origin, Purposes & Psychology 83, 84 (1973).
47. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Terrorism, Drugs, International Law and the
Protection of Human Liberty chs. 1, 4 (1992).
48. Code of Manu, bk. VII, 18, 23–24; bk. VIII, 17.
49. See, e.g., Judges chs. 15, 19, 20. When the perpetrator was not found, sometimes his
village was utterly destroyed. 
50. Deuteronomy 19:21: “Do not look on such a man with pity. Life for life, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, and foot for foot!” See also Exodus, 22:32, 22:1, 22:6;
Robert Francis Harper, The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon (1999). This code,
which applied some 4,000 years ago, applies both the lex talionis and compensation. See,
e.g., Rule 196: “[i]f a man destroy the eye of another man, they shall destroy his eye.” Id.
at 73. Cf. William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice act 1, sc. 3, ll. 157–67. 
51. Exodus 21:24; Dinstein, supra note 2, at 68.
52. 11 The Civil Law 64–66 (S.P. Scott, ed. & trans., 2001).
53. See I Kings 2:28–34.
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and the perpetrator purge the “taint.” When Jericho fell to Israel, “they
utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and
old, and ox, and sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword.”54 Another
example is found in chapters nineteen and twenty of Judges. A concubine
of the “Levite sojourning on Mount Ephraim” had been raped and mur-
dered. The Levite believed that certain citizens of Gibeah, Benjamites, had
committed the crime. The Levite sent a “diplomatic note” along with a
portion of the concubine’s cadaver to each of the other tribes of Israel to
symbolize the need for solidarity to obtain vengeance for the crime. When
the Benjamites failed to deliver the alleged perpetrators, they were virtually
annihilated; every man, woman, child, animal, and plant were extirpated
from Gibeah, and only six hundred or so men were left in the tribe of
Benjamin.55
The Cheyenne required purging through punishment, including a
“breaking of the arrows” ceremony for tainting the food or water supply.56
Intra-tribal murder “required the keeper of the arrows to cleanse the tribe
of the specter of death” through punishment.57
Many societies favored the cleansing qualities of fire for their method
of capital punishment. Nero burned people at the stake to propitiate
Vulcan, the god of fire.58 Although these forms of ancient punishment are
repugnant to us today, the mystical need to seek retribution, to “cleanse,”
“heal,” and make society whole again after it has been tainted continues.59
Throughout history, ancient or more recent memory of crime commit-
ted prompts a desire for retaliation. Oppression or perceived oppression is
impetus for retaliation and punishment when the chance arises. Any
member of the opposing group (family, clan, tribe, people, religion, class,
nation-state) becomes the subject of retaliation. The retaliator is not
viewed by his or her own group as a criminal or a terrorist because he or
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54. Joshua 6:21.
55. See Judges chs. 19, 20.
56. Robert A. Fairbanks, The Nation State Status of American Indian Tribes: A Case
Study of the Cheyenne Nation 31 (1976) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Columbia University)
(on file at the Columbia University Law Library); Karl Llewellyn & Edward Adamson
Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (1941).
57. Numa Denis Foustel de Coulanges, La Cité Antique, bk. III, ch. XIII (1864);
Llewellyn & Hoebel, supra note 56.
58. Graeme Newman, The Punishment Response 43 (1985), citing 15 Tacitus 44.
59. See Fyodor Dostoyefsky, Crime and Punishment (Sidney Monas, trans., 1968). 
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she is an instrument of the group’s need to avenge and expiate itself. Once
this occurs, the other group feels that a crime has been committed against
it and is thus justified in a counter-reprisal. The blood feud—the vendetta—
rages. No doubt, violence is justified in certain circumstances, but not
when intentionally or recklessly applied to non-combatants or innocent
civilians. Rape, murder, torture, and maiming innocents are criminal in
wartime as in peacetime.60 They are often terrorism.
B. Other Historical Reigns of Terror
Society, through the ages, has faced dialectical reigns of terror. Some of
them tell poignant and valuable stories to provide insight into current
reigns of terror and “counterterror.” 
1. Medieval Abuse: Terror in the French Middle Ages, Through the
Seventeenth Century, and the French Revolution: The Rule of Law
As Power
Terror and power interrelated in a horrifically emblematic
and theatric way, as French medieval theoreticians and
technicians of punishment used the symbol of the bourreau
(the executioner) to represent the king’s power.61 Contemplate
the playing card king. His inverted reflection represented the
person condemned to be “expiated” for attempted regicide,
of which parricide was the functional equivalent, or, at least
symbolic enough to receive the same punishment. This is
important because society was based on a political and eco-
nomic structure where the patriarch represented the king in
his realm, and was coopted and protected as a mini-king.
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60. E.g., Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, bk. III, 723, 733 (1625) (Francis W.
Kelsey et al. trans., 1925) (“the death of innocent persons must be prevented ‘so far as is
possible’”); Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account 99 (2005). 
61. Foucault, supra note 43, at 11–13, 28–30, analyzing Ernest H. Kantorowitz, The King’s
Two Bodies (1959). Before punishment could be inflicted, it was necessary to “establish guilt.”
This was done by formulary torture, which was intended to find what was called “the objec-
tive truth.” The only means to obtain truth was out of the accused’s mouth, so the inquisitor
applied torture to obtain this “truth.” See Bernard Gui, Manuel de l’inquisiteur (Guillaume
Mollat, ed. & trans., 1926). See also, e.g., Jean Kellaway, The History of Torture and Execution
58–59 (2000) (“water torture”); H.C. Lea, The Inquisition of the Middle Ages (1961).
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Throughout Roman history and much of the medieval appropriation of a
simplified version of Roman law for feudalistic systems, the patriarch or
paterfamilias was coopted to make him a mechanism to foster the king or
emperor’s power. The legal, economic, and political systems functioned
through the paterfamiliae, in a system that can be described as a pyramid
with the emperor or king at the top. Each paterfamilias had his own little
pyramid. Each had pretty close to absolute power within their pyramid.
Hence, parricide or attempted parricide was the functional equivalent of
regicide or attempted regicide, in that it threatened the essential authority of
the chief patriarch or paterfamilias, the king.
The king’s opposite simultaneously represented the powerlessness of the
condemned and the people. The omnipotent king held control of life and
death over his subjects. One who would challenge that power had to be
shown to have absolutely no power or hope. It would not do simply to exe-
cute him: the executioner was to take that régicidaire up to the very edge of
death by torture, then bring her back again, then up to death and back
again—up and back, up and back, a thousand times. The bourreau was “the
man of a thousand deaths.”62 Finally, the individual was “allowed” to die
when it suited the king.63 The traitor and the people were shown not even
to have the power to die—demonstrating the king’s power over their very
soul. The ritual demonstrated a policy of terror to impress the people with
the power of the king.64
It is natural and right that people revolt against such power. The French
Révolutionaires did so applying tactics of terror learned from their former
masters in the Ancièn Régime. They turned on their former masters; the
Reign of Terror followed. The king card simply rotated; régicidaire became
“king,” the former king and his supposed supporters became ritual victims.
Violence is certainly justified in some circumstances—in rebellion and
revolution to escape oppression.65 Violence and terror against innocents,
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62. See Foucault, supra note 43, at 26–31.
63. Id., at 3–6, 12, 26–32.
64. Id., at 48–50; Michael Guest, Beckett and Foucault: Some Affinities, 15 Cent. Japan
Eng. Stud. 55–68 (1996). Consider the execution of the regicide, Robert-François Damiens.
See Foucault, supra note 43, at 26–31 (“flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and
calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the
said parricide, burnt with sulfur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away,
melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and
body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds . . .”).
65. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 2 (4th ed., 1869) (justifying specified resistance or
general rebellion to establish political liberties and rights).
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however, are neither noble nor justified. When revolution takes that turn,
it descends to a self-destructive reign of terror. Murder has always been
murder, rape, rape, and terror, terror. So it was, under the Ancièn Régime and
the following Reign of Terror, no matter how it was rhetorically “glorified”
or “justified.”
When violence explodes with its ferocious and relentless intensity against
those who “represent” or “symbolize” the enemy, it often consumes those
who wield it. Évariste Gamelin (in Anatole France’s novel Les Dieux Ont
Soif ),66 a sensitive artist interested in rectifying injustice, becomes a para-
noid monster as he is consumed with the need and desire to guillotine all
who might have been connected in the slightest way with the Ancièn Régime
and, finally, no real nexus was needed at all. “Righting wrongs,” in Gamelin’s
case, ultimately destroyed not only the original oppressors (who had wielded
violence first, to oppress and to maintain power), but also innocent proxies
and, finally, those who used it second, to avenge the former evil. Violence
and rage, thus, consume the good that prompts them. Gamelin, who was
finally decapitated by his beloved guillotine, makes the point when his
hatred and self-delusion persuade him that “evil-doers” were everywhere and
that they were seeking expiation through the guillotine, “as a right.”
From all sides the victims surrender themselves. Nobles, virgins, soldiers,
prostitutes flock to the Tribunal to extract their delayed condemnations
from the judges, claiming death as a right, which they are eager to savor.67
Perhaps we all have not reached that level of depravity or mental disease,
but can we really say that we are much different today, when we condone,
acquiesce to, or are willfully blind to massive slaughter of innocents, torture
and murder in the name of fighting “terrorism?”68 Our executive sovereign
has tried to keep this sort of atrocity secret but he kidnaps people and tortures
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66. Anatole France, Les Dieux Ont Soif 198 (1978). Madame DeFarge, of Dickens’s Tale
of Two Cities, is also an interesting literary symbol of this. She had good reason to wish to
avenge herself and the French people. The Revolution was justified. DeFarge knit and reg-
istered all who would be executed to avenge and “free” her people. Once the wave of vio-
lence and concomitant power took hold, they consumed her as she embodied them.
Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (1859). See generally Ruth Scurr, Fatal Purity:
Robespierre and the French Revolution (2006). 
67. Id., at 198.
68. For a shattering allegory on willful blindness, see José Saramago, Blindness (Juan
Sager, trans., 1997).
NCLR1004_04.qxd  3/1/08  11:10 AM  Page 568
them.69 When found out, the sovereign pretends that he commits those atroc-
ities “only against terrorists” or “evil-doers.” That is not a legal excuse or jus-
tification, anyway, and the policy is applicable by “law” to anyone whom our
executive sovereign signals as “terrorists.” Other nations and groups do simi-
larly, so ultimately everyone is subject to attack by groups who kidnap, tor-
ture, and murder “their enemies,” including innocents, for the “greater good.”
In war, revolution, or any situation, when violence is intentionally or
wantonly applied to innocents or non-combatants, it is murder, a war
crime, a crime against humanity, or terrorism, even if rhetorically glori-
fied. The French revolution overcame the Ancièn Régime, but adopted its
slaughter of innocents, ultimately giving rise to the directorat, a regime
that was at least as bad as the Ancièn Régime. A balance and relative end to
the violence eventually developed as a result of the rule of law. However,
the rules of humanity have not changed; violence against innocents remains
immoral and criminal and excuses or justifications are meaningless.
2. The Very Early “Modern Era”
Suarez, Vittoria, Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Emerich de Vattel all
called for the rule that each nation has an obligation to “prosecute or
extradite.”70 They argued that punishment was necessary for those who
commit serious offenses, requiring that there be no sanctuary for the crim-
inal.71 Later, ascendant “positivism” in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and first
half of the twentieth centuries posited the rule that international law was
binding only on states and could not impose obligations or punishment
directly on individuals.72
In 1768, the great criminalist Cesare Beccaria, like natural law jurists
Grotius, Jean Bodin, and Vattel, argued that “the conviction of finding
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69. See, e.g., Larisa Alexandrovna & David Dastych, Soviet Era Compound in
Northern Poland was Site of Secret CIA Interrogation, Detentions, Raw Story, March 7,
2007, at http://www.rawstory.com/news/2007/Sovietera_compound_in_Poland_was_site_
0307.html.
70. See, e.g., Grotius, supra note 60, bk. II, at 526–29; Jean Bodin, The Six Books of a
Commonwealth 100–11 (K.D. McRae, ed., 1962); Emerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens
311–13 Liv. 2, ch. 6, §§ 76–77 (1916).
71. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 70.
72. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Albin Eser & Otto Lagodney, The Individual in the
Face of International Cooperation in Criminal Matters (2002); Linda E. Carter,
Christopher L. Blakesley & Peter J. Henning, Global Issues in Criminal Law 7–17 (2007).
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nowhere a span of earth where real crimes were pardoned might be the
most efficacious way of preventing their occurrence.”73 Beccaria’s chef
d’oeuvre, Dei Delitti e Delle Pene, has profoundly influenced Western crim-
inal justice. His theory focuses on philosophical utilitarianism and the
idea of “just desserts” (retributivism). He believed that punishment for
crime should follow directly and surely upon its commission and that the
punishment must fit the offense. Yet he insisted on moderation, fairness,
and humanitarian values based on law, regardless of the perpetrator. He
believed that extradition could play a significant role in diminishing crime.
In a manner reminiscent of current antiterrorism rhetoric, Beccaria
wanted to eliminate impunity and sanctuaries for criminals, but consid-
ered it crucial that extradition be fair and based on law.74 No black hole
secret prisons or extraordinary renditions for Beccaria. Careful to develop
concepts of extradition that promoted humanitarian criminal justice,
Beccaria qualified his pro-extradition stance by stating that he would not
decide an extradition’s ultimate usefulness until the law began to conform
to the “needs of humanity.”75 Beccaria’s writings influenced extradition
law, the rule of speciality,76 and the idea of dual criminality,77 but his over-
arching vision has yet to come to fruition. The blood feud, the mal du siè-
cle, which really appears to be eternal, accelerates in the new millennium.
Violence for expiation may begin as an effort to extend or consolidate
power or to oppress opposition. Or, it can begin as an effort to throw off
oppression, or as an effort to extend or consolidate power or to oppress
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73. Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e Delle Pene, in James Anson Farrer, Crimes and
Punishments 193–94 (1880). See also Grotius, supra note 60, at 526–29; Bodin, supra note
70, at 100–111.
74. Beccaria, supra note 73, at 193–94. See generally M. Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and
the Origins of Penal Reform (1973) (discussing the alternate, ancient religious rationale for
the swift and sure punishment sought by Beccarian penology).
75. Beccaria, supra note 73, at 193–94.
76. The rule of speciality requires that a requesting state not prosecute the returned
fugitive for any crime other than that for which he was extradited. See, e.g., United States
v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1988); Christopher L. Blakesley, A Conceptual
Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 Utah L. Rev.
685, 731–60; Roger Merle & André Vitu, Traité de Droit Criminel: Problems Généraux de
la Science Criminelle § 436–38 (2d ed., 1973).
77. Dual criminality requires refusal to extradite, unless the alleged conduct is criminal
in both the requesting and the requested states. See, e.g., United States v. Herbage, 850 F.2d
at 1465. Merle & Vitu, supra note 76, at 415–16 (récipocité d’incrimination).
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opposition. Or, it can begin as the perpetrators see it, to make the world safe
for their ideology, their “way of life,” or their religion. Other times, the
wronged group or state looks to right wrongs or to obtain retribution.
Sometimes, it is the nihilist looking to destroy the status quo with terror.
Even the nihilist seems to have an almost metaphysical vision of the need
to destroy, using violence, war, terrorism, crimes against humanity, and
torture to reap vengeance, or, hypocritically, to gain power, becoming a
bureaucratic functionary. Once the perpetrators gain power, they use ter-
ror to maintain it, and the cycle continues. Today we have developed some
mechanisms for legal prosecution. We occasionally use them.
I I I .  EXPOS ITORY VIOLE NCE
Sometimes violence in its various forms is motivated by a zealot’s vision—a
radical vision of “truth” or “good order” that must be enunciated, established,
and maintained by any means necessary, including violence against innocents.
Leaders often exploit the zealot’s tendencies to promote a favored political
order. Almost any ideology, philosophy, or religion may be used to promote
murderous fanaticism.78 Powerful groups and states often use these crimes to
maintain that power and wealth.79 For example, the Dirty Wars in Argentina
and in Chile used terror-based offenses to punish dissent and threats to their
power and vision of the “good order.”80 The records of Nazi, Stalinist, Maoist,
and Khmer Rouge regimes are infamous enough that they need no citation.
Members of some “radical” movements continue to slit throats or behead
captured civilians, journalists, or soldiers, as pathetic advertisements for their
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78. See, e.g., Blakesley et al., supra note 44, at 1117–27 (parallel crimes committed by
the Soviet block under the “Brezhnev Doctrine,” and those committed by the U.S. under
the Reagan Doctrine).
79. Mario Vargas Llosa, La Fiesta del Chivo (2000) (insight on state and non-state
terrorism). 
80. See generally Argentina Dirty War 1976–1983, http//www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/war/argentina.htm; Mark J. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah
Arendt: Criminal Consciousness in Argentina’s Dirty War (2001); Mark Oisel, The
Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1797
n.216 (2005); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L. J. 2537 (1991); Christopher L. Blakesley,
Autumn of the Patriarch: The Pinochet Extradition Debacle and Beyond—Human Rights
Clauses Compared to Traditional Derivative Protections Such As Double Criminality, 91
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (2000).
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pretended cause, while others, including states, continue, in turn, to torture,
kidnap people, and kill indiscriminately. Human history provides far too
many tragic episodes of innocents sacrificed to “send a message.” The “mes-
sage” may be sent to quash insurgency or rebellion, to embolden allies, to
warn citizens or adherents of the consequences for cooperating with the
enemy, or to terrorize populations, intimidating them into surrender.
Consider the carpet bombing of London, Dresden, and Tokyo.
Consider the effects of dropping a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, where the leaflets dropped over Japan prove that the explicit aim
was to slaughter innocents to create terror.81 The warning to the people of
Nagasaki was similar to the one used in Hiroshima.
WAR N I NG NAGASAKI
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81. PBS, American Experience, Truman, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/
psources/ps_leaflets.html. These leaflets were dropped on August 6, 1945.
Attention Japanese People. Evacuate your cities.
Because your military leaders have rejected thirteen part surrender
declaration, two momentous events have occurred in the last few days.
The Soviet Union, because of this rejection on the part of the military
has notified your Ambassador Sato that it has declared war on your
nation. Thus, all powerful countries of the world are now at war with you.
Also, because of your leader’s refusal to accept the surrender decla-
ration that would enable Japan to honorably end this useless war, we
have employed our atomic bomb.
A single one of our developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent
in explosive power to what 2000 of our giant B29s could have carried on
a single mission. Radio Tokyo has told you that with the first use if this
weapon of total destruction, Hiroshima was virtually destroyed.
Before we use this bomb again and again to destroy every resource of the
military by which they are prolonging this useless war, petition the emperor
now to end the war. Our president has outlined for you the thirteen conse-
quences of an honorable surrender. We urge that accept these consequences
and begin the work of building a new, better, and peace-loving Japan.
EVACUATE YOU R CITI E S
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The use of certain weapons designed to cause massive death or unneces-
sary suffering constitutes a war crime, a crime against humanity, or terror-
ism, depending on the context.82 The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings
were calculated to terrorize83 and induce panic among Japan’s population
and leadership so that they would surrender.84 The Allies chose Nagasaki
because it was “undefended” in the legal sense of the Hague Conventions
and other international law,85 to signal to the Japanese that we will vaporize
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82. Moral philosophers agree that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings were terror-
istic and immoral. See, e.g., Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations ch. 13 (3d ed., 2000); Michael Walzer, Terrorism: A Critique
of Excuses, in Problems of International Justice 237; (Steven Luper-Foy, ed., 1988); John
Rawls, Fifty Years after Hiroshima, in Collected Papers 565 (Samuel Freeman, ed., 1999);
Igor Primoratz, The Morality of Terrorism, 14 J. Applied Phil. 221, 231 (1997). While
accepting the faulty idea that a “supreme emergency” will justify or excuse killing of inno-
cents, Walzer, Rawls, and Primoratz condemn the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
and the blanket bombing of Dresden and others, because they find that the excuse did not
obtain. See C.A.J. Coady, Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency, 114 Ethics 772,
777 (2004) (finding these bombings to be immoral). Coady rejects the “supreme emergency”
excuse as to intentional or reckless killing of innocents. So do I. On the other hand, pro-
tecting innocents does not appear to have a clear policy in philosophy and practice.
Augustine, Contra Faustum, XXII, at 75 (Philip Schaff, ed., 1956); Reynolds, supra note
28, at 4–5 n.12, 85. Augustine’s “punitive model for warfare” made “no distinctions between
combatants and civilians . . . because there is no moral difference between the two. St.
Augustine’s moral emphasis on the guilt of the enemy population could justify violence
against it. The premise of guilt as justification for war was also justification to protect those
who were not guilty.” Id. at 5 n.12.
83. We must distinguish terror in the general sense, as a war tactic, from terrorism, since
the latter involves innocent targets. Destroying the enemy’s will to fight is often a purpose
of a terrorist act, but does not necessarily make a violent act an act of terrorism. Harlan K.
Ullman coined the phrase “shock and awe” in a 1996 report calling for a strategy involving
massive coordinated precision air attacks that destroy the enemy’s will to fight while also
destroying the enemy’s physical ability to fight. Such a strategy may or may not constitute
terrorism, depending on whether innocents are targeted.
84. See Richard A. Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks
upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 Am. J. Int’l. L. 759, 761 (1965) (describing victims with
“rags of hanging skin, wandering about . . . [and lamenting] among the dead bodies”).
85. Herman Reinhold, Target Lists: A 1923 Idea with Applications for the Future, 10
Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 1, 11, n.52, nn.20, 26 (2002); Elliot L. Meyrowitz, The Laws of
War and Nuclear Weapons, in Nuclear Weapons and Law 19, 32 (Arthur Miller & Martin
Feinrider, eds., 1984). Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 27, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. The Japanese argued in the
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even your innocents, unless you capitulate. Many still consider this conduct
to be “acceptable,” arguing that warnings of the terrible consequences of
not surrendering were given to Japan—that the Japanese leadership knew
that the United States had the bomb and that it would be used if their
government did not submit to all Allied demands by a certain date.
Terrorists often emphasize that their acts come as a consequence of gov-
ernments ignoring their warnings.86 Warnings, then atrocity, provide a
common theme in total war,87 but warnings and shared fault cannot
excuse targeting innocent civilians. 
IV.  TH E R E IG N OF “COU NTE RTE R ROR”
We delude ourselves, pretending that we do not commit terrorism, when
we are manipulated to believe that we may use terrorism or terrorist tactics,
because we have justice, goodness, or God on our side, or when we claim
that because others commit terrorism, we may do the same. These delu-
sions are self-destructive. To define or characterize terrorism on the basis
of the end sought is misguided and self-defeating. Terrorism must be
defined in a manner that does not excuse or exclude one’s own conduct.88
Dashiell Hammett warned, “Play with murder [we can insert torture or
terrorism] enough and it gets you one of two ways. It makes you sick, or
you get to like it.”89 Camus wrote, “[E]ven if murder is in the nature of
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Shimoda case that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were undefended before the atomic bombs
were dropped, so article 25 of Hague IV applied. See Hilaire McCoubrey, International
Humanitarian Law: Modern Developments in the Limitation of Warfare 8–17 (2d ed.,
1998) (also article 27 shows “[t]he basic principle of limitation of legitimate bombardment
to military objectives . . .”). 
86. See, e.g., John Alan Cohan, Symposium, Necessity, Political Violence and
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man, the law is not intended to reproduce that nature.90 Terrorism is crimi-
nal. So are its analogues, torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity,
including indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The danger is as grave for
the torturer’s, war criminal’s, or terrorist’s well-being as it is for the nation
or group that accommodates him.
A. Propagandistic Appropriation91 of Law and the Term Terrorism
From the legal and moral justifications to “do whatever it takes” to fight
for a just cause to the manifestos and self-righteous calls for vengeance,
counter-terrorist measures bear an increasing resemblance to terrorism
itself. Legislators, judges, scholars, and people on all sides seem willing
to justify, excuse, or ignore conduct that is morally repugnant, illegal,
and dangerous to their own interests. Terrorism and counterterrorist
overreaction strains the core of democracy. Some professed libertarians
argue that abuse, even torture, are appropriate or acceptable under
extreme circumstances. Sadly, abusers have the power. Governmental
overreaction and abuse at home or abroad, using rhetoric of fighting
terrorism, providing security, or protecting “the homeland,” erodes
security, democracy, and constitutional liberty. People have allowed
their leaders to manipulate their fear of terrorism and have acquiesced
to the erosion of morals, the constitutional legal system, and any sense
of right and wrong. Using terrorism to “fight” terrorism makes us ter-
rorists. We lose our moorings when we descend to the level of simple
vengeance or become so fearful and overwrought that we commit or
condone atrocity. 
B. The United States and Torture
Torture is an example. Michael Ignatieff wrote, “we need to widen out our
reflections, think about the moral nihilism of torture and why—this is the
most painful question—torture remains a temptation, even a supposed
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necessity, in a war on terror.”92 Ignatieff continued, “[torture] when com-
mitted by a state, expresses the state’s ultimate view that human beings are
expendable. This view is antithetical to the spirit of any constitutional
society whose raison d’etre is the control of violence and coercion in the
name of human dignity and freedom.”93 The moral nihilism of torture94 is
revolting, yet to the Bush administration, torture is functionally “legal-
ized” by narrow definition and pretended executive power.95 The law is
perverted to accommodate our government’s moral nihilism. Those who
make the decision to violate our values in the name of “security” or “anti-
terrorism” or “democracy” must not be allowed to devalue our law and
morals by being given impunity. Law itself is corrupted. We are corrupted.
Professor Dershowitz may be correct that torture will always occur in
perceived emergencies. But if we allow Congress or our judiciary to be
complicit in torture or terrorism, we enshrine that conduct as “legal.”
When we do this, it represents what we are. Justice Jackson’s dissent in
the Koramatzu case captured this mechanism with reference to an apho-
rism by Cardozo: “[a]n enshrined rule” will “expand to the limits of its
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logic.”96 Thus, whether we allow torture is a matter of principle, morality,
and legality: it reflects our standards.97 All torture and terrorism must be
treated as criminal.
VI .  CONCLUS ION 
Behind you swiftly the figure comes softly,
The spot on your skin is a shocking disease.
Clutching a little case,
He walks briskly to infect a city
Whose terrible future may have just arrived.98
Sartre represents many who have justified violence against innocents,
arguing that anyone not engaged in fighting the adopted cause were ene-
mies, hence, the equivalent of aggressors or oppressors.99 Camus correctly
rejected this ethic to the extent that it finds virtue in slaughtering inno-
cents even for a supposed just cause.100 One can defend innocents of the
world without destroying other innocents.
The established clichés or the “ethic” of order based on terror lead ulti-
mately to a moral and legal abyss. Statists who seek to maintain or expand
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their power, like the power-seeking terrorists, apply ideology based on
demonization of others and death. Thus, oppression and exploitation of
human beings to accommodate one’s material interests, even if disguised
in some high-sounding abstraction, are terroristic.101 In the end, self-
justification and self-delusion allow so-called enemies to feel justified in
their counter-vengeance and sought expiation. Oppression, terrorism,
most states of emergency, and in-kind counter-violence are of a kind. They
continue the frightening cycle of tyranny, evil, and death102 that we pas-
sively allow through our government or leaders. Our obligation as human
beings is to fight passionately to save the lives of all other human beings.103
Sartre correctly but incompletely argued that a war of national libera-
tion “once begun . . . gives no quarter.”104 In any conflict, however, inten-
tional or reckless killing of innocents by states or any group is criminal
even if deemed justifiable or acceptable for a “just cause.” Sartre’s attitude
is especially troublesome when groups are manipulated into accepting
unending conflict. President Bush has adopted that ethic, calling for a
“War against Terrorism,” which will be continual and indefinite, requir-
ing all our devotion.105 Is it really far fetched to compare the “Crusade”
against Islam during the Middle Ages with the marketing of a “clash of civ-
ilizations?” Policy makers and pundits have cynically used 9/11 as a “battle
flag” call for vengeance in their version of “Holy War.” If both sides believe
in an ongoing, unending war for survival against “evil doers,” values,
human rights, morals, and civil liberties are at risk. It is becoming clear
what we will accommodate when we remain in a state of emergency setting.
What are we willing to become? Torturers, killers of innocents, terrorists? A
fight for survival, even one for gaining or retaining power, may cause peo-
ple to do unspeakable things, but the law must not—does not—justify,
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excuse, or accommodate this. It is not morally or legally justifiable to kill
innocents, regardless of how effectively it is perceived to be or how much
it intimidates others.106
Terrorism and current responses to it are of one cloth. Simone Weil and
Thomas Merton were not far off in expressing this, as they described a
great beast, which is the urge to collective power, “the grimmest of all the
social realities.”107 They said, aptly, that this lust for power is masked by
the symbols of “nationalism, fundamentalism, capitalism, fascism, [and]
racism.”108 I would add perversions of religion, morality, and values,
including sovereignty, self-determination, liberation, revolution, freedom,
democracy,109and national security. Often, what is represented as morality,
religion, values, democracy, freedom, etc., is really “a chimerical state of
things in which one would keep for oneself alone the power to make war
while all other countries would be unable to do so.”110 By manipulating a
people’s sense of community, ethnicity, heritage, nationalism, or religion,
and by causing fear that these are at risk, insecurity and xenophobia are
fostered. Leaders cause their followers to commit or acquiesce to unspeak-
able acts. It is important to explode the myths used to foment such vio-
lence or terrorism and crimes against humanity will be the “norm.”
Terrorism poses a vicious threat to peace and human dignity, but the
ordinary person may be capable of overcoming the manipulation that
prompts participation. There may be a common core of values that allows
us to recognize these crimes and to condemn them.111 We condemn easily
when these crimes are committed against us. We need to instill in ourselves
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the vision and fortitude to recognize and resist when “our leaders,” or our
compatriots, want to pursue that sort of conduct against “others.”
Terrorism is condemned—it is criminal—whether committed by states
against their own inhabitants or extraterritorially. It is criminal whether
perpetrated by occupiers, insurgents, oppressors, or those struggling for
independence or freedom from oppression. Individuals commit these
offenses whether as direct actors or as functionaries acting in their official
governmental capacity or as functionaries of nongovernmental groups. All
of these principals are subject to law and may be punished for commit-
ting directly or aiding and abetting the criminal conduct analyzed here-
in. Impunity must be eliminated. 
If prosecution is to occur, the elements of the offenses must be clearly
established. Thus, this criminal conduct we call terrorism includes: (1) vio-
lence committed by any means; (2) causing death, great bodily harm, or
serious psychological harm; (3) to innocent individuals; (4) with the intent
to cause those consequences or with wanton disregard for those conse-
quences; (5) for the purpose of coercing or intimidating some specific
group, or government, or otherwise to gain some perceived political, mil-
itary, or other philosophical benefit. Torture is analogous, even when the
victim is a captured enemy fighter.
Human rights protections for victims and the accused must be clarified
and vigorously maintained. To date, this has not been done well in treaties
or statutes. Perhaps customary and jus cogens principles, as manifest in the
domestic laws of virtually all nations, provide the needed clarity and speci-
ficity. The penal codes of all nations and the customary rules of groups
everywhere condemn the conduct discussed herein. 
The pretentious justifications, excuses, and rationalizations given by
apologists for those who commit atrocity ring hollow, and are frighten-
ingly familiar.112 Care must be taken to ensure that international and
domestic action to obtain justice and to prosecute perpetrators does not
fall into the same trap that ensnared those who committed the crimes. If
we allow ourselves to descend to simple vengeance, terrorism, torture and
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similar atrocity, because of our fear or insecurity, or in the name of “fight-
ing terrorism” or fighting for “freedom” or “God,” we are lost. We must
remind ourselves of John Milton’s poignant warning: 
So spake the Fiend, and with necessity. 
The tyrant’s plea, excus’d his devilish deeds’ 
and it is still the shibboleth of the descendants 
of the Prince of Darkness.113
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